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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellant National Data Payment Systems, Inc. ("NDPS") 
entered into a contract to purchase Meridian Bank's 
("Meridian") merchant credit card business. The parties 
failed to close the deal prior to the contractual termination 
date. After the termination date had passed, Meridian 
exercised its option to call off the deal. NDPS brought suit 
against Meridian for breach of contract, alleging that it had 
failed to exercise its best efforts to bring the deal to a close. 
NDPS also sued CoreStates Financial Corp. ("CoreStates"), 
which had announced its planned acquisition of Meridian 
shortly before the events in dispute, for tortious 
interference with contractual relations. The District Court 





On September 15, 1995, NDPS entered into a Purchase 
Agreement (the "Agreement") with Meridian Bank for the 
purchase of Meridian's merchant credit card business. 
Three provisions of the Agreement are especially relevant to 
this case: 
 
Closing/Best Efforts Clause -- Section 3.1 provided that a 
closing was to occur "on the date to be mutually agreed 
upon by the parties which shall be within thirty (30) days 
after the expiration or termination of any applicable waiting 
period under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements 
Act of 1976." (App. 378-79.) The section further provided 
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that "Meridian and NDPS agree to use their best efforts to 
achieve satisfaction of the conditions to Closing set forth in 
the Agreement and to consummate the Closing on the 
terms and subject to the conditions set forth in this 
Agreement." (App. 379.) 
 
Termination Clause -- Section 11.1 provided that the 
"Agreement may be terminated by either Meridian or NDPS 
and shall be of no further force and effect . . . (b) in the 
event the Closing shall not have occurred by October 30, 
1995." (App. 399.) 
 
Written Waiver Clause -- Section 15.8 provided that 
"[t]his Agreement . . . shall not be amended, modified or 
waived in any fashion except by an instrument in writing 
signed by the parties hereto." (App. 404.) 
 
The Agreement also contained a covenant that Meridian 
would not compete with NDPS in the merchant credit card 
business for ten years. (App. 388.) This covenant did not 
extend, however, to any company that subsequently 
acquired Meridian. (App. 389.) 
 
On October 10, 1995--before the Agreement had 
closed--CoreStates announced that it had entered into a 
merger agreement under which it would acquire Meridian. 
CoreStates operated its own merchant credit card business 
and believed that Meridian's merchant portfolio--whose 
sale to NDPS was then pending--would be a valuable 
addition to its own business. CoreStates and Meridian thus 
decided to contact NDPS to see if it was still planning to go 
forward with the transaction. 
 
On Thursday, October 26, 1995, Meridian arranged a 
conference call between representatives of NDPS, Meridian 
and CoreStates to discuss the effect that the CoreStates 
merger would have on the pending sale. Meridian Senior 
Vice President Michael Hughes opened the call by stating 
that "[w]e really have two options at this point in time. To 
proceed under the terms of the definitive agreement, or to 
mutually agree to terminate." (Hughes Dep., App. 160.) 
Meridian explained that the pending merger with 
CoreStates could change the economics of the NDPS- 
Meridian deal, because the Purchase Agreement's non- 
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competition covenant would not extend to CoreStates. 
(Hughes Dep., App. 160.) 
 
CoreStates senior executive Thomas Kaplan then took the 
floor. In an exchange that various participants 
characterized as "heated" and "threatening," (Bucolo Dep., 
App. 67; Shea Dep., App. 215), Kaplan stated that 
CoreStates was building a network of "business banking 
centers" which would generate merchant credit leads. 
(Bucolo Dep., App. 67.) Kaplan claimed that CoreStates 
would not be required to share these leads with NDPS 
under the Agreement: "look, you know if you do this 
agreement, you're not going to get these referrals. . . . you 
guys just aren't going to get the value out of this deal." 
(Bucolo Dep., App. 67.) Meridian Vice President Chris 
Bucolo, who participated in the call, testified that he 
believed that "Mr. Kaplan's intent was to not allow the 
conversation to go anywhere other than, you know, if this 
deal goes through, you're not going to get the value."1 At the 
end of the call, NDPS told Meridian that it would advise it 
of whether or not it wanted to proceed with the deal by the 
next Monday or Tuesday (that is, October 30 or 31). 
 
The next day (Friday, October 27), Bucolo was told by 
Hughes that Meridian was "going to let the closing date 
[October 30] go by without responding to [NDPS] and 
basically try to rely on that part of the contract to not go 
through with the deal." (Bucolo Dep., App. 69-70.) As 
Bucolo understood it, "the game plan was to let the date 
essentially come and go and then rely on it to kill the deal." 
(Bucolo Dep., App. 69-70). 
 
As of the following Monday--the October 30 termination 
date--Meridian had not heard back from NDPS. That day, 
Hughes called NDPS Senior Vice President Kevin Shea to 
inquire as to the status of the deal. Shea told Hughes that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Bucolo also testified that he believed that Kaplan's reference to 
CoreStates' "business banking centers" was"overstated" and "not 
consistent with the facts." He stated that the call was the first time he 
had ever heard of these centers, and that CoreStates subsequently 
informed him that there were "only a couple" in existence at that time. 
As a result, Bucolo opined that Kaplan's statements about the banking 
centers "seemed like a sham." (App. 68.) 
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NDPS was meeting on the topic that day, and that they 
would call Hughes back later that day or the next day. 
Hughes said that this would be "fine." (Shea Dep., App. 
218.) Although Hughes recognized that October 30 was the 
"drop-dead date" under the Agreement, he consciously did 
not bring this fact to Shea's attention.2  (Hughes Dep., App. 
163.) 
 
NDPS, in fact, did not get back to Meridian that day or 
the next. On November 2, Hughes had a telephone 
conversation with NDPS Vice President Eugene Horn, 
during which Hughes mentioned that the October 30 
termination date had passed. (Horn Dep., App. 137.) Horn 
testified that he conveyed his own belief that NDPS wanted 
to close, and promised to get back to Hughes the next day. 
(Horn Dep., App. 137.) 
 
On Friday, November 3, Horn again spoke with Hughes 
and advised him that NDPS was "prepared to close 
immediately." (Horn Dep., App. 141.) According to Horn, 
Hughes stated that Meridian was prepared to go forward 
with the closing and asked NDPS to set a date. (Horn Dep., 
App. 141.) Hughes disputes this account; on his telling, he 
never agreed on behalf of Meridian to close the deal. 
(Hughes Dep., App. 166-70.) Later that day, Horn faxed a 
letter to Hughes purporting to memorialize their 
conversation; the letter stated that its purpose was"to 
confirm our agreement to close the Purchase Agreement 
between Meridian Bank and National Data Payment 
Systems, Inc. on Tuesday, November 7, 1995 at 2:00 p.m. 
Georgia time at the offices of National Data Corporation in 
Atlanta." (App. 428-29.) Hughes was out of the office on 
November 3 and did not personally receive the letter until 
he returned to work on the following Monday, November 6. 
 
On Monday, November 6, Meridian sent NDPS written 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. While NDPS does not dispute that the Purchase Agreement explicitly 
contained an October 30 termination date, NDPS apparently did not 
focus on this provision until it was ultimately invoked by Meridian. 
According to one NDPS executive, NDPS's in-house legal counsel, when 
asked how long NDPS had to close the deal, mentioned only the 30-day 
window following Hart-Scott-Rodino clearance contained in S 3.1 without 
alluding to the termination provision. (Horn Dep., App. 126-27.) 
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notice that it was terminating the Agreement pursuant to 
S 11.1. NDPS notified Meridian that it considered the 
termination a breach of the Agreement, and filed suit in 
federal court. 
 
NDPS raised two primary arguments: first, that Meridian 
had breached its obligation to use "best efforts" to 
consummate the transaction during the period before the 
termination date; and second, that Meridian impliedly 
waived its right to rely on the termination provisions after 
October 30, 1995. NDPS also brought a claim against 
CoreStates for tortious interference with the Purchase 
Agreement. 
 
After discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment. 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
all defendants. See National Data Payment Sys., Inc. v. 
Meridian Bank, 18 F. Supp. 2d 543 (1998). NDPS then 
moved for reconsideration of the District Court's opinion 
and order, claiming the court had failed to rule on its "best 
efforts" claim. The District Court denied NDPS's motion, 
stating that it had considered and rejected the"best efforts" 




On appeal, NDPS challenges three of the District Court's 
rulings: (1) the grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Meridian on NDPS's "best efforts" claim; (2) the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Meridian on NDPS's claim 
that Meridian waived its right to terminate the Purchase 
Agreement; and (3) the grant of summary judgment in favor 
of CoreStates on NDPS's tortious interference claim. 
Pennsylvania law governs all of these claims. We address 




NDPS first argues that Meridian breached the Purchase 
Agreement by failing to use its best efforts to effectuate a 
closing prior to the October 30 termination date. NDPS 
acknowledges that, once the October 30 date had passed, 
the termination option contained in S 11.1 superseded the 
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best efforts obligation of S 3.1. Consequently, NDPS does 
not argue that Meridian's November 6 termination, in itself, 
breached the contractual best efforts duty. Rather, NDPS 
claims that Meridian breached the contract by its conduct 
prior to the October 30 "drop-dead" date. We reject this 
claim. 
 
NDPS points to several specific actions which it claims 
breached Meridian's good faith obligation. First, NDPS 
alleges in general terms that Meridian decided "to align 
itself with CoreStates' desire to retain Meridian's Merchant 
Business" rather than to sell it to NDPS. Appellant's Br. 42. 
According to NDPS, this alignment gave rise to Meridian's 
"game plan" to let the clock run on the Purchase Agreement 
until the October 30 termination date had passed. Second, 
NDPS points to Meridian's participation in the October 26 
conference call, during which NDPS alleges that CoreStates 
misrepresented certain facts concerning its business 
banking centers and processing of referrals. NDPS alleges 
that Meridian was aware of these misrepresentations and 
had a duty to call them to NDPS's attention. Finally, NDPS 
relies on Meridian executive Michael Hughes's conscious 
failure to mention the termination date during his October 
30 phone conversation with an NDPS official. 
 
The duty of best efforts "has diligence as its essence" and 
is "more exacting" than the usual contractual duty of good 
faith. 2 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts, 383- 
84 (2d ed. 1998). Notwithstanding this high standard, 
NDPS's allegations are insufficient as a matter of law to 
defeat the District Court's grant of summary judgment. 
Even if Meridian's actions constituted a default of its best- 
efforts obligation, NDPS has provided absolutely no 
evidence that, had Meridian's behavior been any different, 
a closing would have occurred by October 30. Indeed, the 
record clearly shows that the delay in closing was the result 
of NDPS's own evaluation procedures. 
 
At the time of the October 26 conference call, NDPS had 
made no effort to schedule a closing before the October 30 
termination date.3 Indeed, NDPS officials testified that they 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We note that the paperwork and other legal formalities which typically 
accompany a closing in a transaction of this magnitude are often 
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had not "focused" on that date; rather, their sole concern 
was to secure closing before the end of the 30-day period 
following Hart-Scott-Rodino approval. Moreover, after the 
October 26 call, NDPS made no efforts to contact Meridian 
about the status of the closing. When Meridian's Hughes 
contacted NDPS on October 30 to inquire eabout its plans, 
NDPS responded that it still had not decided whether to go 
through with the deal or not. Although NDPS claimed that 
it would have a definite answer by the next day at the 
latest, it did not make its final decision to close until 
November 3, well after the termination date. By this time, 
Meridian's good faith obligation had been superseded by 
the Agreement's express termination option, and it was free 
to call off the deal at its discretion. 
 
Any "game plan" that Meridian might have had to delay 
closing until after October 30 cannot be relevant to this 
appeal, because NDPS has presented no evidence that it 
would have closed by that date under any circumstances. 
NDPS's claim that its closing was delayed because it needed 
to reassess its position in light of CoreStates's 
representations does not change this fact. Even on the eve 
of the NDPS-Meridian-CoreStates conference call--a mere 
four days before the October 30 termination date--NDPS 
had made no attempt to schedule a closing, and NDPS does 
not suggest on appeal that it would have done so had the 
conference call not occurred. 
 
Moreover, we believe that Meridian had no duty under 
the Agreement's best-efforts provision to remind NDPS of 
the approaching termination date. The October 30 
termination provision was the subject of substantial 
negotiations during the Agreement's drafting, and it was 
explicitly spelled out on the face of the Agreement. NDPS is 
a sophisticated business party who was represented by in- 
house and outside counsel throughout the events that are 
the subject of this lawsuit. NDPS was on notice of the 
termination date provision, and it cannot blame Meridian 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
substantial and time-consuming. NDPS admits that it had not scheduled 
a closing date as of October 26--four days before the termination 
date--and does not suggest that it could have been prepared to close 
prior to October 30. 
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NDPS next argues that Meridian's course of conduct 
constituted an implied waiver of the termination date 
provision. In particular, NDPS relies on the October 30 
conversation between Hughes and Shea, in which Shea 
indicated that NDPS would have an answer on October 31 
as to its plans to close. Hughes replied that this would be 
"fine," which NDPS reads as a waiver of the October 30 
deadline. 
 
We reject this argument. As the District Court noted, the 
Agreement's no-oral-waiver clause "clearly and 
unequivocally indicates the intention of the parties that 
there be no modifications or waivers of the contract 
provisions except in a writing signed by both parties. The 
parties even provided that delay in exercising rights under 
the contract would not constitute a waiver of those rights." 
National Data, 18 F. Supp. at 548. 
 
NDPS attempts to avoid the no-oral-waiver clause by 
recharacterizing its argument as an estoppel theory. To 
succeed on an estoppel claim under Pennsylvania law, 
however, NDPS must show that it was "misled and 
prejudiced" by Meridian's conduct. See 2101 Allegheny 
Assocs. v. Cox Home Video, Inc., 1991 WL 225008, *9 (E.D. 
Pa. Oct. 29, 1991) (quoting Consolidated Rail Corp. v. 
Delaware & H.R. Co., 569 F. Supp. 25, 29-30 (E.D. Pa. 
1983)). "As a general rule, mere silence or inaction is not a 
ground for estoppel unless there is a duty to speak or act." 
2101 Allegheny, 1991 WL 225008 at *10 (quoting Farmers 
Trust Co. v. Bomberger, 523 A.2d 790, 794 (Pa. Super. 
1987)). 
 
In this case, NDPS could not have been prejudiced by 
Meridian's statement that a response by October 31 would 
be "fine." Even if NDPS had reasonably relied on this 
representation, the record shows that it did not, in fact, 
respond to Meridian on October 31. Rather, it waited until 
November 3 to propose a closing. At most, Hughes's 
statement would have estopped Meridian from exercising its 
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termination right on October 31; it could not have bound 
them until November 3. 
 
Meridian's principal case, Cohen v. Weiss, 51 A.2d 740, 
742-43 (Pa. 1947), is inapposite. Cohen dealt with a sale-of- 
property contract which contained a termination provision 
similar to the one at issue here. The buyer attempted to 
contact the seller on the termination date to arrange a 
closing three days after that date. The seller, however, did 
not respond to this request and instead delayed his 
decision until the next day so that he could exercise the 
termination option. Throughout, the seller used the pretext 
of his son's illness to induce the buyer into believing that 
his mind was not on the transaction. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court found that the seller was estopped from 
terminating because his delay and deceit functioned" `as a 
trap' to put the purchaser `off his guard.' " Id. at 743. 
 
In the present case, in contrast, NDPS never made a 
concrete request to close prior to the termination date; nor 
was there any affirmative misrepresentation by Meridian. 
The facts before us are more analogous to New Eastwick 
Corp. v. Philadelphia Builders Eastwick Corp., 241 A.2d 766 
(Pa. 1968), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held 
that a party who merely remained silent and allowed a 
termination date to pass without comment was not 
estopped from exercising its termination option. Here, as in 
New Eastwick, Meridian's mere inaction "can in no way be 
said to give [the appellant] permission to ignore the then 




Finally, NDPS appeals the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of CoreStates on the tortious 
interference with contract relations claim. The District 
Court found that CoreStates was privileged to influence 
Meridian's contract because it was a prospective purchaser 
of Meridian with a substantial financial interest in the deal. 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, "[t]he tort of inducing breach of 
contract . . . is defined as inducing or otherwise causing a 
third person not to perform a contract with another . . . 
without a privilege to do so." Glazer v. Chandler, 200 A.2d 
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416, 418 (Pa. 1964). A number of federal courts, construing 
Pennsylvania law, have held that a corporate parent or 
prospective corporate parent is privileged to interfere with 
the contractual relations of its subsidiary. In Green v. 
Interstate United Management Services Corp., 748 F.2d 827 
(3d Cir. 1984), a parent corporation instructed its wholly- 
owned subsidiary not to sign a lease after an appraiser 
opined that the contract was a bad bargain. This Court 
found that the interference was privileged due to the 
parent's interest in preventing the dissipation of its 
subsidiary's assets. Similarly, in Advent Systems Limited v. 
Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1991), we noted 
that a prospective purchaser's "interest in thefinancial 
stability of its subsidiary and the need to avoid a situation 
where the two would be working at cross-purposes justified 
the disruption" of pending contract negotiations with a 
third party. In Mercier v. ICH Corp., 1990 WL 107325 (E.D. 
Pa. July 25, 1990), relied on by the court below, the 
District Court extended this reasoning to interference by a 
prospective corporate purchaser. In Mercier, the defendant 
ICH planned to buy Tenneco's Philadelphia Life subsidiary. 
Prior to the purchase, Tenneco and plaintiff Mercier agreed 
to various severance conditions relating to Mercier's 
employment at Philadelphia Life. On ICH's urging, however, 
Tenneco decided not to follow through with the agreed- 
upon severance package and Mercier sued for tortious 
interference. The District Court granted summary judgment 
in favor of ICH, noting that "[b]ecause ICH had expressed 
its intention to acquire Philadelphia Life from Tenneco, it 
was privileged to influence the severance contract Tenneco 
offered to Mercier, relating to his continued employment or 
termination by Philadelphia Life." Id. at *15. 
 
These cases support the District Court's conclusion that 
CoreStates, as a prospective purchaser of Meridian, was 
privileged to influence Meridian's contract obligations. This 
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that CoreStates 
expressed its intention to remain in the merchant credit 
processing business--an undertaking that would place it 
"at cross-purposes" with Meridian's sale of its own 
merchant business assets. See Advent Sys., 925 F.2d at 
673. 
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We note, however, that a recent decision by the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court has embraced a narrower 
version of the corporate parent privilege than was 
explicated in the above-cited cases. See Shared Comm. 
Servs. of 1800-80 JFK Boulevard, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic 
Properties, Inc., 692 A.2d 570 (Pa. Super. 1997). The Shared 
Communications court distinguished Advent Systems and 
Green, noting that in those cases, the parent's privilege to 
interfere was based upon its interest in preventing the 
waste of the subsidiary's corporate assets. See id. at 575. 
The court found it significant that 
 
       In neither of those cases did the corporate parent 
       instruct the subsidiary to abrogate contractual 
       relations with a third party in order to commence those 
       same relations with another subsidiary of the same 
       corporate parent. In neither of those cases did the 
       corporate parent instruct the subsidiary to ignore its 
       contractual relations with a third party and 
       surreptitiously provide services to a corporate"sibling" 
       which the subsidiary was contractually bound to 
       deliver to a third party. 
 
Id. It went on to conclude that when the interference is "not 
to prevent asset dissipation, but rather, to help[the parent] 
to aggrandize," there is no privilege. Id. 
 
As Shared Communications indicates, the exact scope of 
the corporate parent privilege is unclear, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet spoken on this 
issue. We need not resolve this difficult question, however, 
because CoreStates offers a second basis for its privilege, 
which we find independently dispositive. 
 
Under the Restatement (Second) of TortsS 768, 
 
       One who intentionally causes a third person . . . not to 
       continue an existing contract terminable at will does 
       not interfere improperly with the other's relation if: 
 
       (a) the relation concerns a matter involved in the 
       competition between the actor and another and 
 
       (b) the actor does not employ wrongful means and 
 
       (c) his action does not create or continue an 
       unlawful restraint of trade and 
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       (d) his purpose is at least in part to advance his 
       interest in competing with the other. 
 
See Gilbert v. Otterson, 550 A.2d 550, 554 (Pa. Super. 1988) 
(recognizing Pennsylvania's adoption of S 768). Because the 
Purchase Agreement was terminable at will (by virtue of the 
October 30 termination date) when Meridian opted to pull 
out, S 768 applies to this case. 
 
CoreStates clearly was a competitor with NDPS in the 
merchant credit card business; it acted to advance its own 
business; and there is no allegation that its interference 
created any unlawful restraint of trade. The determinative 
question, then, is whether CoreStates "employ[ed] wrongful 
means." Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not 
yet supplied a definition of wrongful means, this Court 
recently noted that a number of jurisdictions have 
interpreted the section "to require independently actionable 
conduct on the part of the defendant." Brokerage Concepts, 
Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 130 F.3d 494, 531 (3d Cir. 
1998) (citing DP-Tek, Inc. v. AT&T Global Information 
Solutions Co., 100 F.3d 828, 833-35 (10th Cir. 1996)). See 
also Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1507 (8th 
Cir. 1992) ("wrongful means" is "conduct which is itself 
capable of forming the basis for liability of the actor"); 
Briner Elec. Co. v. Sachs Elec. Co., 680 S.W.2d 737, 741 
(Mo. App. 1984) (same). 
 
This "independently actionable" approach is borne out by 
the commentary to S 768. Comment (e) states that 
"wrongful means" includes "predatory means . . . physical 
violence, fraud, civil suits[,] criminal prosecutions, [and] 
exerting a superior power in affairs unrelated to their 
competition." Restatment (Second) of Torts  S 768, cmt. e. 
Each of these enumerated activities would itself be 
independently actionable under the laws of torts or unfair 
competition. Based on these factors, we believe that 
Pennsylvania would follow the "independently actionable" 
approach for S 768 claims. 
 
Because the conduct of which NDPS complains was not 
independently actionable, CoreStates is protected by the 
competitor's privilege. Taking all facts in the light most 
favorable to NDPS, we conclude that CoreStates, at most, 
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overstated its future ability to compete with NDPS through 
its network of business banking centers. NDPS relies 
primarily on the following statements by CoreStates' Kaplan 
during the October 26 conference call, as recounted by 
Meridian Vice President Chris Bucolo: 
 
       [H]e said things like, we're building a network of 
       business banking centers that aren't branches, and 
       that's where all of our leads are going to get generated. 
       So even if it says we're going to get branch referrals in 
       the agreement, most of our leads aren't even going to 
       go through the branches. They're going to come 
       through these business banking centers that we're 
       building. He said, look, you guys just aren't going to 
       get the value out of the deal. 
 
(Bucolo Dep., App. 67.) Bucolo further testified that after 
the call, CoreStates admitted to him that they had"only a 
couple" business banking centers in place. (Bucolo Dep., 
App. 68.) 
 
These allegations are insufficient as a matter law to 
establish independently actionable fraud. A statement as to 
future plans or intentions is not fraudulent under 
Pennsylvania law unless it knowingly misstates the 
speaker's true state of mind when made. See College 
Watercolor Group, Inc. v. William H. Newbauer, Inc. , 360 
A.2d 200, 206 (Pa. 1976). Here, NDPS has presented no 
evidence to indicate that CoreStates did not, in fact, plan to 
build an extensive network of banking centers, even if they 
were not in existence at the time of the October 26 
conference call. Because CoreStates' representations did 
not constitute independently actionable fraud, and because 
CoreStates has satisfied all of the other requirements of 
Restatement S 768, it was privileged and therefore protected 





For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court is affirmed. 
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